價值分配的不同觀點

A Different View of Value Appropriation
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麥可.萊奧爾繪製了亞馬遜早期的價值網絡,說明提供產品或服務過程中各個參與者之間的關係,參與者包括:企業、供應商、顧客。

嗨,我是麥可.萊奧爾,在多倫多大學羅特曼管理學院擔任策略教授。過去十年間,研究人員在開發出策略數學理論方面,取得重大進展,我稱之為價值獲取模型。價值獲取模型,是要分析產業內推動績效的競爭驅動因素。這張圖表以質化的形式,呈現來自一種價值模型的關鍵見解,而這種模型使用的是價值網絡圖這種圖形裝置。

首先來看一般性的價值網絡圖。起點是價值網絡本身。價值網絡包含所有參與經濟價值生產的各方,包括上游供應商、生產伙伴、下游企業,以及最終使用者,每個人都間接或直接透過一條交易路徑連結,而這條路徑的終點是一項最終的銷售。

繪製網絡圖時,我們把價值網絡中的各組參與者,圍繞一個內圈排列,這個內圈代表價值pi,也就是價值網絡內,各成員聯合活動所產生的經濟價值總量。一般來說,價值pi是最終使用者,對某產業的產品和服務的總效用或總購買意願,減去用於提供這些產品的材料和資源的經濟成本。

這種經濟價值,最終會由創造它的價值網絡成員取得。當然,其中包括買家。在參與者組成的圈子之外,就是我們所謂的競爭邊陲,其中包括那個網絡外的所有參與者,這些參與者與網絡內的參與者進行交易,如此所創造的經濟價值,會超過他們透過目前的交易所創造的價值。基本上,這些參與者對於與網絡內參與者的交易,產生了過剩需求。

邊陲對公司的需求,保證公司至少可以取得所產生價值的一部分。保證取得的價值數量,等於防止該公司放棄本身網絡,改為與邊陲參與者打交道所需的價值數量。通常在網絡裡,用這種方式透過競爭來確保所有人的最低價值比率,加總起來不會達到100%。

這意味公司所獲得的價值數量,取自兩個來源,一個是通過邊陲競爭來保證的價值量,也就是我之前說明的那種,另外一個來源是一項額外的價值,透過我們概括稱為「說服力」的事物來取得,說服力包括公平主張、議價技能、產業規範,也就是邊陲競爭之外的一切事物。

整體來看,價值網絡圖凸顯了幾個重點。第一,產業是由競爭、還是由說服力來決定價值獲取,各產業情況不同。這些差異意味著成功所需的不同資源。第二,企業網絡中與他人競爭所保證占有的最低價值比率,為企業自身獲取價值的能力設定了上限。

公司取得的最大價值比率,是1減去其他所有人取得的最小比率。公司得到的,是介於競爭保證的最小值與這個最大值之間。第三,目前與企業進行交易的參與者,不會為此產生競爭。例如,隨著潛在買家成為真正的買家,企業必定會變得更加仰賴說服力,而非競爭性資源。

舉一個具體案例,來說明這些想法:亞馬遜成立之後頭六年或七年,始終處於虧損狀態,即使到目前仍未獲利,原因是亞馬遜與買家的競爭中,存在不利的平衡。要了解這一點,就要先檢視它的價值網絡。以網路圖書零售商來說,這種價值網絡非常簡單。

它主要包含上游圖書出版商、亞馬遜、下游圖書買家。在亞馬遜開始營運的同時,邦諾書店也推出自己的網路零售圖書業務,名為邦諾網站。為了簡化這個例子,我們假設亞馬遜價值網絡的競爭邊陲,完全由邦諾價值網絡中的參與者所組成,這些參與者就是邦諾網站、它的買家、它的圖書供應商。

它們都位於亞馬遜價值網絡圖的競爭邊陲。這種網路零售業務的顯著特徵之一,就是網路零售商不受貨架空間的限制,實體零售商則有這種限制,今天情況顯然仍是如此。因此,每個偏好與亞馬遜交易的人,都能夠與亞馬遜交易。

邦諾網站的買家與它交易的唯一原因,是他們更喜歡這樣,勝過與亞馬遜交易。所有的買家都位在自己想待的地方。但與此同時,邦諾既能夠服務自己的顧客,也能服務亞馬遜的顧客。請注意這種不平衡。儘管亞馬遜的顧客更喜歡亞馬遜的服務,勝過邦諾的服務,但對他們來說,邦諾是很接近的第二選擇。

換句話說,如果強迫亞馬遜的顧客進入邦諾的網絡,這個網絡產生的價值就會增加。但另一種情況是,把亞馬遜加進邦諾的網絡中,而這可能不會增加價值,因為邦諾的買家滿足於向邦諾購買。因此在一方面,對亞馬遜的顧客來說,來自邊陲地帶的競爭很激烈,這確保他們取得很大比率的價值。另一方面,對於亞馬遜本身根本沒有競爭,導致保證獲取的價值為零,因而造成長期虧損。

(劉純佑譯)


Michael D. Ryall maps Amazon's early value network, illustrating the relationship among the players involved in delivering a product or service: a firm, its suppliers, and its customers.

Hi my name is Michael Ryall. I'm a Professor of Strategy at the University of Toronto's Rotman School of Management. Over the past decade, researchers have made significant strides towards the development of a mathematical theory of strategy that I refer to as the value capture model. The value capture model is intended to analyze the competitive drivers of performance within an industry. This exhibit illustrates in qualitative form several key insights that arise from the value capture model using a graphical device called value network maps.

Let's begin with a generic value network map. The starting point is the value network itself. A value network consists of all the agents engaged in the production of economic value, including upstream suppliers, production partners, downstream firms, and ultimately end users, everyone who is linked indirectly or directly through a path of transactions that terminates with a final sale.

To set up the map, we take the set of agents in the value network and arrange them around an inner circle that represents the value pi, that is the aggregate quantity of economic value produced with the joint activities of those within the value network. Generically, this is the aggregate end user utility or willingness to pay for an industry's products and services minus the economic cost of the materials and resources used to provide them.

This economic value winds up being appropriated by the members of the value network that created it. And of course this includes the buyers. Outside the circle of agents making up the value network is what we call the competitive periphery. This consists of all the agents outside the network who would create more economic value by transacting with someone inside the network than the value they create through their present transactions. Basically, these agents create excess demand for transactions with the agents in the network.

The demand from the periphery for a firm guarantees that firms some minimal share of the value produced. The amount guaranteed is equal to the quantity of value required to prevent that firm from abandoning its network in favor of dealing with agents in the periphery. Typically within a network the sum of everyone's minimum share, guaranteed in this way by competition, does not add up to 100%.

This means that the amount of value captured by a firm comes from two sources, an the amount of value guaranteed it by competition from the periphery, as I've just described, and an additional amount appropriated by what we loosely refer to as persuasion, such things as arguments of fairness, bargaining skill, industry norms, everything other than competition from the periphery.

Taken as a whole, the value network map highlights several important points. First, industries differ in the extent to which value capture is determined by competition versus persuasion. These differences imply different resources required for success. Second, the minimum value shares guaranteed by competition to others in a firm's network impose a ceiling on what a firm's own ability to capture value is.

The firm's maximum share of value is one minus the minimum shares of everyone else. What the firm gets is something in between its minimum guaranteed by competition and this maximum. Third, the agents presently transacting with a firm do not generate competition for it. For example, as its potential buyers become actual buyers, a firm must rely more and more upon persuasive, rather than competitive, resources.

Let's consider a specific case that illustrates these ideas, amazon.com in the first six or seven years of its existence. Amazon was unprofitable throughout this period – and by the way, continues to struggle even today -- as a result of an unfavorable balance in competition for it and its buyers. To see this begin with its value network. As an online book retailer, this value network was simple.

It consisted primarily of upstream book publishers, amazon.com, and downstream book buyers. Now at the same time that Amazon started its business, Barnes and Noble launched its own online retail book business called barnesandnoble.com. So to keep the example simple, let's suppose that the competitive periphery of Amazon's value network consisted entirely of the agents in Barnes and Noble's value network, that is barnesandnoble.com, it's buyers, and its book suppliers.

So these would be in the competitive periphery of amazon.com's value network map. One of the salient features of this online retailing business was that online retailers were not constrained by shelf space as were their bricks and mortar counterparts, which is still true today obviously. Therefore, everyone who preferred to transact with amazon.com got to transact with amazon.com.

The only reason that barnesandnoble.com's buyers were transacting with it was that they preferred that to transacting with Amazon. All the buyers were where they wanted to be. At the same time though, Barnes and Noble had the capacity to serve both its and Amazon's customers. Note the imbalance. While Amazon's customers preferred its services to those of Barnes and Noble, Barnes and Noble was a close second for them.

In other words, if one had forced Amazon's customers into the Barnes and Noble network, the value produced by that network would have increased. Alternatively however, adding amazon.com to the Barnes and Noble network would have resulted in no increase in value because Barnes and Noble buyers were content to purchase from Barnes and Noble. Thus, on the one hand competition from the periphery was strong for Amazon's customers, assuring them a significant share of the value. On the other hand, it was essentially non-existent for Amazon, resulting in zero guaranteed capture value and as a result, a long string of losses.



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